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1. Introduction 
Urbanisation, population growth and increasing reliance upon secure and dependable services such as water, energy 
and telecommunications has put pressure on urban Critical Infrastructure (CI) networks and associated services. 
However, with technological advancement comes increasing interdependency, with almost all networks experiencing 
some degree of reliance upon other CI and the failure of a single element of the urban network can quickly cascade, 
impact other CI or escalate to other systems, potentially paralysing the entire network for an extended period. 
The functioning of modern cities relies on the services of many CI networks such as the energy grid, water supply, 
transportation, telecommunication, etc. These CIs are interconnected and cannot operate in isolation to deliver their 
services to end users. A failure in one CI network could quickly propagate across the network and affect other CI 
services. Such cascading effects can be investigated at a ‘systems of systems’ level instead of individual system to 
determine how the interdependencies among different CIs influence the services to the whole community [1]. 
Within the water supply network, for example, a burst main may not only limit water supply service to a region, 
but also cause localised flooding, this flooding could damage a substation supplying electricity to a railway or road 
traffic signals and bring the transportation network to a halt. Another example is an extreme storm surge that may lead 
to coastal flooding inundating a wastewater network pumping station, subsequently causing sewer flooding and 
Combined Sewer Overflows (CSO). Both examples of flooding could likely disrupt road networks, potentially 
isolating the area and preventing emergency services from reaching vulnerable communities in good time. Once the 
interdependencies are identified, the risk of various hazard scenarios can be properly evaluated to help decision makers 
set up adaptation strategies for enhancing urban resilience against hazards. 
The RESCCUE (RESilience to cope with Climate Change in Urban arEas) project aims to develop a multi-sectorial 
approach, focusing on water to improve the resilience of urban services for the future climate. Within RESCCUE, a 
comprehensive flood resilience assessment framework is developed considering the impacts on natural, physical, 
economic, social and institutional dimensions to quantify the effectiveness of adaptation measures. This framework 
involves all urban services and functions potentially affected by flooding e.g. transport, the other water systems, energy 
supply, solid waste, etc. 
In the winter 2016/17, Thames Water experienced three major mains burst events in one week and attended to 1,000 
pipe burst repairs within another week [2], [3], hundreds of residents were evacuated during the accidents and main 
roads were closed for several days. Thames Water reviewed the causes of eight high profile events but concluded that 
there were no common causes for all the events [4]. However, better risk management practice and improved predictive 
analysis was cited as a key recommendation for preventing future accidents.  
In this paper, we demonstrate the concept of CI interdependency through the evaluation of burst water mains 
scenario in Bristol, UK. This relatively simple case study tests the approach of analyzing impacts with limited data 
and the results show the feasibility of the methodology can be implemented for more complex scenarios. 
2. Methodology 
Due to the sensitive nature and/or absence of data relating to the spatial location of the water distribution systems 
network we’re making inferences about the supply network and likely burst points along the network. The burst points 
along the network are in relative proximity to each other and a flood model is run for each scenario. Due to the 
assumptions made both in terms of network layout and burst point locations, the resulting flood maps are speculative 
and as such a fuzzy based approach was used to define the risks of CI being impacted by burst water mains in this 
study.  
2.1. Case study 
In order to demonstrate the links between water, health and energy networks, a small area in the center of Bristol 
was chosen. This area houses Bristol Temple Meads (Bristol’s central train station), the Bristol Royal Infirmary (one 
of Bristol’s major hospitals) and emergency services as well as being a high density residential and business district.  
As the exact location of the water distribution network in this area is unknown, we assumed that the pipe network 
follows the road network. Failure or ‘bursting’ points were set at 100 m linear intervals along the pipe network. 
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1. Introduction 
Urbanisation, population growth and increasing reliance upon secure and dependable services such as water, energy 
and telecommunications has put pressure on urban Critical Infrastructure (CI) networks and associated services. 
However, with technological advancement comes increasing interdependency, with almost all networks experiencing 
some degree of reliance upon other CI and the failure of a single element of the urban network can quickly cascade, 
impact other CI or escalate to other systems, potentially paralysing the entire network for an extended period. 
The functioning of modern cities relies on the services of many CI networks such as the energy grid, water supply, 
transportation, telecommunication, etc. These CIs are interconnected and cannot operate in isolation to deliver their 
services to end users. A failure in one CI network could quickly propagate across the network and affect other CI 
services. Such cascading effects can be investigated at a ‘systems of systems’ level instead of individual system to 
determine how the interdependencies among different CIs influence the services to the whole community [1]. 
Within the water supply network, for example, a burst main may not only limit water supply service to a region, 
but also cause localised flooding, this flooding could damage a substation supplying electricity to a railway or road 
traffic signals and bring the transportation network to a halt. Another example is an extreme storm surge that may lead 
to coastal flooding inundating a wastewater network pumping station, subsequently causing sewer flooding and 
Combined Sewer Overflows (CSO). Both examples of flooding could likely disrupt road networks, potentially 
isolating the area and preventing emergency services from reaching vulnerable communities in good time. Once the 
interdependencies are identified, the risk of various hazard scenarios can be properly evaluated to help decision makers 
set up adaptation strategies for enhancing urban resilience against hazards. 
The RESCCUE (RESilience to cope with Climate Change in Urban arEas) project aims to develop a multi-sectorial 
approach, focusing on water to improve the resilience of urban services for the future climate. Within RESCCUE, a 
comprehensive flood resilience assessment framework is developed considering the impacts on natural, physical, 
economic, social and institutional dimensions to quantify the effectiveness of adaptation measures. This framework 
involves all urban services and functions potentially affected by flooding e.g. transport, the other water systems, energy 
supply, solid waste, etc. 
In the winter 2016/17, Thames Water experienced three major mains burst events in one week and attended to 1,000 
pipe burst repairs within another week [2], [3], hundreds of residents were evacuated during the accidents and main 
roads were closed for several days. Thames Water reviewed the causes of eight high profile events but concluded that 
there were no common causes for all the events [4]. However, better risk management practice and improved predictive 
analysis was cited as a key recommendation for preventing future accidents.  
In this paper, we demonstrate the concept of CI interdependency through the evaluation of burst water mains 
scenario in Bristol, UK. This relatively simple case study tests the approach of analyzing impacts with limited data 
and the results show the feasibility of the methodology can be implemented for more complex scenarios. 
2. Methodology 
Due to the sensitive nature and/or absence of data relating to the spatial location of the water distribution systems 
network we’re making inferences about the supply network and likely burst points along the network. The burst points 
along the network are in relative proximity to each other and a flood model is run for each scenario. Due to the 
assumptions made both in terms of network layout and burst point locations, the resulting flood maps are speculative 
and as such a fuzzy based approach was used to define the risks of CI being impacted by burst water mains in this 
study.  
2.1. Case study 
In order to demonstrate the links between water, health and energy networks, a small area in the center of Bristol 
was chosen. This area houses Bristol Temple Meads (Bristol’s central train station), the Bristol Royal Infirmary (one 
of Bristol’s major hospitals) and emergency services as well as being a high density residential and business district.  
As the exact location of the water distribution network in this area is unknown, we assumed that the pipe network 
follows the road network. Failure or ‘bursting’ points were set at 100 m linear intervals along the pipe network. 
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2.2. Flood simulation 
A flood model simulating a pipe burst event at each of these locations was run separately using the CADDIES 2D. 
The CADDIES 2D model thus generates a maximum flood depth inundation map for each simulated burst location. 
This model was chosen due to its computationally simplified Cellular Automata approach that allows for multiple 
simulations to be carried out in relatively short time frames in comparison to more computationally demanding models 
[5]. 
2.3. Identifying high risk areas 
Fig. 1 shows the flow process of how maximum flood depths from each model are used to derive the final fuzzy 
risk occurrence map. The fuzzy risk occurrence map is then combined with the maximum depth maps to create a risk 
matrix view (Fig. 2) of the risk of impacts to an infrastructure, where we combine the level of impact (associated with 
maximum depth value) with the likelihood of impact (derived from fuzzy occurrence map). To achieve this the 
occurrence likelihood raster map that was generated is reclassified to a range of 0 – 3 that corresponds to a zero 
membership (value of 0) or high membership of a cell being flooded (value of 3). An additional overall maximum 
depth raster map is also created by combining all the maximum depth maps from each simulation (from 1 to N) and 
only taking the maximum recorded depth in each cell. These depths are then also reclassified with ranges from 0 – 3 
based on the perceived severity of impact water depth in that cell could cause. The sum of these two raster maps thus 
creates a risk score map corresponding to both the flood class membership and perceived severity of the flood impact.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Creating fuzzy flood risk map from pipe burst events 
Previous research has been done in translating water depth data into monetary damage via spatial analysis of water 
depth data and its proximity to buildings with different land use characteristic [6]; a modified version of this approach 
was used where the risk map data is substituted in place of water depth data.  Spatially analysing the risk output data 
with respect to its proximity to critical infrastructures, allows for risk scores can to be applied to each infrastructure. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Simple 3 x 3 Risk Matrix where risk = likelihood x impact 
Fig. 3 shows the layout of the sections of pipe, with 21 simulated burst locations and a number of CIs including 
electrical substations, emergency services, hospitals and the railway. 
When investigating the possible impacts of flooding within the area, three classes of risks were analysed: 
 
• Direct risk of flood water on infrastructures; 
• Indirect risk to infrastructure/service due to potential loss of power; and 
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• Indirect risk to infrastructure/service due to diminished road access.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Study area around Bristol Temple Meads indicating key critical infrastructure locations and theoretical pipe network 
The direct risk level to an infrastructure is determined by analysing the values of the fuzzy risk map that are within 
range (2 m buffer) of building polygons. The indirect risk to infrastructure due to power loss is determined by analysing 
the risk levels in proximity to electrical substations potentially supplying power to those buildings. Due to the absence 
of data in relation to which substations provide power to which buildings, it was assumed that electricity supply to 
buildings comes from the nearest substation. In this approach, we assume that there is a high likelihood that an 
infrastructure that lies within a substation’s service area is supplied energy from that substation. To define the area 
that is receiving power from an electrical substation we generate Voronoi (otherwise known as Thiessen) polygons [7] 
and assume power is provided to the buildings that lie within these zones. The final indirect risk to an infrastructure 
relates to the perceived level of access to roads. If flood water presents on the road (or railway) and the depth is above 
a threshold depth, then the road (or railway) was assumed to be either blocked or at a reduced capacity. 
Within the scope of this paper the primary focus was on the impacts of a pipe burst upon the emergency services 
within the study area. 
3. Results & Discussion 
For pipe failure scenarios, we assumed that the pipe network was part of a trunk main with a diameter of 800 mm 
and a flow rate of 300 L·s-1 with a burst duration of 2 hours. As there are 21 burst pipe locations (shown in Fig. 3), the 
CADDIES 2D was run multiple times to generate 21 possible maximum depth flood extents. Utilising the approach 
depicted in Fig. 1 and setting a threshold depth of 0.1 m, a fuzzy occurrence map was generated (Fig. 4A).  
 
 
Fig. 4. (A) Fuzzy occurrence map due to pipe burst scenarios, (B) Derived fuzzy flood impact risk map 
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For this study of 21 simulations (pipe burst locations) were carried out. During the simulations the maximum 
percentage of times certain cells were flooded with a depth equal or greater than 0.1m was 33% which corresponds (in 
this instance) to the highest level of membership of a cell being in a flooded state. The maximum recorded water depth 
in a cell during all the simulations was 3.6m. To convert this information into a fuzzy impact risk matric as defined in 
Fig. 2 we need to reclassify memberships and depth/impacts into values ranging from 0 – 3. The derived risk matrix 
is thus calculated via reclassifying the data from the fuzzy occurrence outputs and the impact level derived from 
maximum depth (Error! Reference source not found.). This reclassification of data generates a fuzzy risk raster map 
that is depicted in Fig. 4B where the level (value) of risk is colour coded with respect to the Risk Matrix view.  The 
distribution of risks reveal that the emergency service locations are at risk, as well as the railway track near the main 
train station. Significant risks to some commercial buildings in the south of the region are also identified though these 
were not investigated within the scope of this paper where the focus is on the emergency service sector. 
 
Table 1. Reclassification of data to generate risk matrix 
Fuzzy Risk Occurrence  
Score Range (%) 
Reclassified Flood 
Membership Level 
Depth Range Reclassified Flood  
Impact Level 
0 – 0.0476 0 0.0 – 0.1 0 
0.0476 – 0.095 1 0.1 – 0.5 1 
0.095 – 0.190 2 0.5 – 1.0 2 
0.190 – 1.00 3 > 1.0 3 
 
3.1. Direct risk to buildings 
The estimation of risk posed to infrastructure is determined via examining the overlap of the risk matrix data with 
the footprint of the infrastructure data (plus a buffer zone around the infrastructure data). In the case of the emergency 
service buildings, this analysis reveals that that both the ambulance station and the fire stations are at risk of direct 
damage due to flooding from the simulated bust pipe scenarios.  Fig. 5 shows that the overall level of risk in this 
instance is greater to the fire station than that of the ambulance station. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Risk of buildings being impacted  
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3.2. Indirect risk - Power loss 
As the substations are represented by point datasets a 10m circular buffer zone is applied around each of the 
substations and a value of the impact risk was derived again via analysing the overlap of risk matrix data with these 
substation buffer zones. The service areas of each of the affected substations is thus linked with the previously 
derived Vornoni polygons, that were then used to identify the zones an risk levels to infrastructures that were likely 
to experience some degree power disruption (Fig. 6). In Fig. 6 only one of the two fire station buildings are affected 
(highlighted by the red square) due to the other part of the building lying within a different electrical substation 
zone. Visual analysis shows that several substations within the immediate vicinity of the ambulance station could be 
potentially taken offline. This visual analysis of risk indicates (based on the assumptions made for which substations 
provide power to which buildings), that the ambulance station is at greater risk of power disruption. 
 
 
 Fig. 6. Indirect risk due to power loss  
3.3. Indirect risk - Road access 
The final analysis shows that the resulting water from the simulated pipe bursts could potentially disrupt road access 
in the vicinity of both the emergency services in question (Fig. 7). The major road network to the east of these 
stations is also at risk, potentially reducing access to the south-eastern part of the city. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Indirect risk due to road access 
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service buildings, this analysis reveals that that both the ambulance station and the fire stations are at risk of direct 
damage due to flooding from the simulated bust pipe scenarios.  Fig. 5 shows that the overall level of risk in this 
instance is greater to the fire station than that of the ambulance station. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Risk of buildings being impacted  
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3.2. Indirect risk - Power loss 
As the substations are represented by point datasets a 10m circular buffer zone is applied around each of the 
substations and a value of the impact risk was derived again via analysing the overlap of risk matrix data with these 
substation buffer zones. The service areas of each of the affected substations is thus linked with the previously 
derived Vornoni polygons, that were then used to identify the zones an risk levels to infrastructures that were likely 
to experience some degree power disruption (Fig. 6). In Fig. 6 only one of the two fire station buildings are affected 
(highlighted by the red square) due to the other part of the building lying within a different electrical substation 
zone. Visual analysis shows that several substations within the immediate vicinity of the ambulance station could be 
potentially taken offline. This visual analysis of risk indicates (based on the assumptions made for which substations 
provide power to which buildings), that the ambulance station is at greater risk of power disruption. 
 
 
 Fig. 6. Indirect risk due to power loss  
3.3. Indirect risk - Road access 
The final analysis shows that the resulting water from the simulated pipe bursts could potentially disrupt road access 
in the vicinity of both the emergency services in question (Fig. 7). The major road network to the east of these 
stations is also at risk, potentially reducing access to the south-eastern part of the city. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Indirect risk due to road access 
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3.4. Stakeholder engagement 
The fuzzy-based approach serves primarily as a means of beginning to quantify impact (reduction of failure of a 
service) risks provided by an infrastructure. It is envisioned that these results could potentially be used as a means for 
engaging with stakeholders to encourage the release and sharing of high quality data to improve the understanding of 
the interdependencies between infrastructures and the inherent risks that come with these. For stakeholder engagement 
the information derived from a fuzzy-based analysis can be fed into tools for use in managing the resilience of a city 
whereby the impacts (both direct and indirect) of certain events can be visualised along with the prospect of 
highlighting potential cascading effects. For example, in the HAZUR®† software we can define the services and spatial 
data highlighted earlier in this paper along with their associated interdependencies e.g. which substations are likely to 
provide power to which buildings and the main roads that are in proximity of those buildings which are needed for the 
services to function adequately. Once the interdependencies have been defined we can (based on simulation results) 
define an event and its impacts through the HAZUR® interface via the “WHAT IF” screen. Fig 8 shows how this data 















The HAZUR® tool facilitates the collection of data about services, infrastructures, interdependencies and impacts 
from multiple users to build up a comprehensive perspective of the workings and resilience of a city and highlighted 
the potential consequences of given impacts. By having all these interdependency links in place this tool can potentially 
highlight indirect and cascading effects of disasters (such as a pipe burst) which may not be immediately obvious to 
stakeholders. By analysing this information the users of the HAZUR® tool can evaluate the resilience of their city to 
certain impact driven events and if needed take appropriate action to improve the level of resilience in anticipation of 
such events 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
This study has investigated the possibility of building up a picture of small section of a city with limited data to 
assess the level of risk to selected CIs would fair against a potential pipe burst event.  
Due to the very nature of CIs data there may be limitations on the availability of high quality data to carry out 
detailed analyses. In the absence of such data, obtaining a fuzzy-based perspective on the risks associated with services 
within a city is a promising approach as first order approximations can be made, high risk areas identified and situations 




Fig 8. INTERDEPENDENCIES, WHAT IF, and GIS MAP data view partial screen grabs taken from the HAZUR tool 
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The results of this study have shown that even with limited data sources a fuzzy based analyses with logical 
assumptions made can begin to create a picture of the level of risks present to CIs within a city. Utilising this fuzzy 
based approach in conjunction with city resilience managing software could provide a baseline for stakeholder 
engagement whereby the model can be later refined as and when more detailed data/information becomes available. 
This framework applied in conjunction with the HAZUR® software could allow city managers to understand 
potential cascading effects resulting from an event such as flooding. Improved visualisation and understanding of the 
related risks to CIs enables the development of tailored prevention, mitigation and response plans and measures, 
making this approach an invaluable mapping exercise for decision makers interested in the resilience of urban CIs. 
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